Matthew Van Alstyne

Product

ScanWorks, boundary-scan board and chip test for regulated hardware

Target

New-logo enterprise accounts in regulated medical and defense hardware

Built

Readiness scorecard, account tiering, buying-committee personas, AI-assisted content, drip sequences

KPI

MQL-to-SQL conversion and a defined new-logo opportunity target

In technical B2B you're not selling to a person, you're selling to a committee, and everyone on it wants something different. A single ScanWorks deal could touch a VP of R&D who cares about time-to-market and budget, a principal hardware engineer who cares whether it plays nicely with JTAG and Altium, a QA director who lives for traceability, a regulatory manager who wants audit trails, and a test engineer who just wants better yield on the production floor. Send all of them the same generic email and it lands with none of them.

The textbook version of account-based marketing assumes a three-person marketing team. ASSET didn't have that. So the real challenge wasn't "do ABM," it was "build an ABM engine a lean team can actually run without it collapsing." I started by being honest about where we stood: an ABM readiness scorecard to baseline us at intermediate instead of pretending we were at nirvana, so we built for reality.

From there I made it disciplined instead of scattershot. I used a TAM/SAM/SOM analysis to tier accounts by who we could realistically win, filtered by vertical and by real engagement signals like webinar sign-ups and form fills, then built named target-account lists in medical and defense. I mapped the full buying committee role by role, so every piece of content had a specific person and a specific concern behind it, not a vague "engineer."

Here's the part that made a small team viable: I leaned on AI as a force multiplier. I built and used Copilot agents, a healthcare prospecting agent and an SEO blog coach among them, to generate persona- and stage-specific content at a volume a one-person content function could never produce by hand. That's the honest reason we could run a real ABM program at our size. Then I wrote drip sequences mapped to persona and buying stage, and for the medical accounts I led with the FDA-audit angle, because "a failed audit halts your production line" is the fear that actually keeps a medtech engineering leader up at night.

The whole discipline came down to one idea: stop selling to the org and start selling to the exact person in the committee, in the language of the thing they're personally measured on.

Proof: ABM readiness scorecard · TAM/SAM/SOM account tiering · buying-committee persona map · AI content agents · persona/stage drip sequences. Available on request.

Problem

Strong theories, zero quantified proof, competitors circling

What I did

Proposed and ran a third-party conjoint analysis to validate the theories

Scale

1,731 screened · 406 completed · 95%+ confidence · ~2-week turnaround

Outcome

Buyer personas, market-share simulations, and a reseller sales tool (shown at PGA)

Marketing has a gap it rarely admits to. Leadership speaks in charts and forecasts, and marketing speaks in campaigns and gut feel, and the two don't connect. BenQ had a classic version of that gap in the golf simulator market. We had strong theories, that consumers wanted true 4K, that resellers were stuck selling lower-res WUXGA out of habit, that a golf sim was really a family "SimTheater" in disguise, but they were hunches. Hunches don't move resellers, and competitors were about to come after the same position. Qualitative data is great for learning and useless for winning an argument.

So I proposed we stop guessing and measure it. I brought in QuestionPro to run a third-party conjoint analysis for around $3,850, which is a rounding error against the revenue riding on being right. Conjoint is the right tool here because it doesn't ask people what they say they want, it forces trade-offs and reveals what they'll actually pay for. We screened 1,731 people, completed 406, and got results at a 95%-plus confidence level in about two weeks.

The data did three things a slide of opinions never could. It built real buyer personas, the golf-sim owner and the avid golfer, with income, age, and what they actually value. It ran market-share simulations by product concept, which surfaced a significant untapped opportunity in a premium 4K configuration aimed at higher-income owners. And it settled the 4K argument with a blind test, where a clear majority preferred our 4K image over the leading 1080p alternative. A strong majority of owners preferred 4K for their screens, and most had already upgraded or considered it.

Then I did the part that mattered most: I turned the analysis into a reseller sales tool, "Deep Insights for Resellers," and presented it at the PGA show. That flipped the relationship. Instead of arguing with resellers about resolution, we handed them customer data they didn't have the time or budget to collect, which is a much better way to earn a partner's trust than telling them they're wrong.

That's the whole thing I care about as a marketer: closing the gap between what we believe and what we can prove, and putting the proof in a form someone can actually sell with.

Proof: Conjoint analysis plan & execution decks · QuestionPro study · "Golf Sim Customer Landscape: Deep Insights for Resellers."

Product

Razberi Monitor™, a cloud health-monitoring subscription

Market

Video surveillance / IoT, sold through integrators and resellers

My role

Owned partner marketing for the launch

Result

3 partners onboarded · lead-to-sale 5 mo to 2 mo · $126K closed · $513K pipeline in 12 months

Selling hardware and selling a subscription are two different sports. With hardware, a reseller sells the box once and moves on. A subscription only works if they keep selling it, keep the customer on it, and actually care whether it renews. Razberi was launching Razberi Monitor, a cloud subscription for remote system health monitoring and its first real recurring-revenue product, into a channel of partners who had spent years selling boxes. Nobody had given them a reason, or the tools, to sell the other way. That was my job.

Here's the gap I kept running into: a reseller won't sell what they can't explain. You can have the best product in the world, but if a rep can't stand in front of a customer and make the case in plain language, it doesn't move. So I didn't start with the product. I started with the partner.

First, a tiered Channel Partner Program (Platinum, Gold, and Silver) with free sales and pre-sales certification. That gave partners a reason to lean in and a path to better margin if they did. Then I built the field tools they were actually missing: a battle card and a reseller field guide that turned "SaaS health monitoring" from a vague concept into a sales conversation, including the recurring-revenue math for the partner's own business. If you want someone to sell recurring revenue, show them their recurring revenue.

The move I'm proudest of was riding an existing channel instead of building a new one. Most of these resellers already sold Milestone's XProtect VMS, so I ran a co-marketing pilot program with Milestone. That met partners inside an ecosystem they already trusted, with a low-risk proof-of-concept so trying the product didn't feel like a bet. Underneath all of it, I mapped the supporting content (a cybersecurity brochure, a C-suite guide, a federal-agency case study) to where buyers actually were in their journey, not just the top of the funnel.

The numbers held up: three new partners actively selling the subscription, lead-to-sale time cut from five months to two, $126,000 closed, and a $513,815 pipeline over the next year. But the number isn't the point I'd make in an interview. The point is that partners stopped selling a box and started owning a relationship. That's the harder thing to teach, and the reason the revenue kept compounding after I moved on.

Proof: Channel Partner Program Guide · Reseller Field Guide · Razberi Monitor battle card · Milestone × Razberi Pilot flyer · Cybersecurity Brochure · C-Suite Guide · Federal Agency case study.

Program

North America Aspire Partner Program

My role

Named program owner in a 12-stakeholder RACI

Constraint

Public launch at ISC West, roughly 90 days out

Result

Launched on schedule · several million in partner-attributed pipeline · promoted to Global mid-program

Most partner programs don't fail because the idea is bad. They fail in the boring middle, where Legal, Finance, Sales, and CRM all have to say yes and nobody owns getting them there. acre needed a new North America partner program, and it needed to be live by ISC West, the biggest trade show in the industry, about 90 days out. That kind of deadline makes a program either real or vaporware. There was no existing framework to inherit. I was the named owner.

The first thing I did wasn't creative. It was a RACI across all twelve stakeholder groups, because the way this dies is five people each assuming someone else owns the compliance sign-off. Once everyone could see who owned what, the deadline stopped being a wish and started being a plan.

From there I worked backward from the ISC West date so every dependency had a real due date. I built the incentive and rebate model with Finance: cross-sell rebate tiers by product category, the budget behind them, and the compliance rules that had to hold for a rebate to actually pay out. Then I sat with CRM to turn those rules into something the system could enforce, because a rebate program the system can't track is just a promise. I ran the partner agreement framework through Legal so partners were signing something defensible, and sequenced the whole thing into a clean public launch on the show floor.

If I'm honest, the real product here wasn't a program document. It was alignment. My job was getting a dozen groups to agree on the same plan in time to execute it, and that's the part most programs never solve.

It launched on schedule and influenced several million dollars in partner-attributed pipeline. Partway through, I was promoted from US to Global Channel Marketing Manager on the strength of how the program came together across teams.

Proof: Internal program (partner agreements, rebate model, CRM rules). Describable in detail; available on request.

Built

An intent-driven prospecting engine (ZoomInfo + HubSpot + reps' Outlook)

Idea

The more specific the trigger, the more personal the email, the better it converts

Deliverable

A 5-level prospecting framework, email sequences, and sales training

Signal

Open rates climbed from ~15% on broad blasts to 75% on tightly targeted segments

Spray-and-pray email is dead, and most companies haven't admitted it to themselves yet. Blasting a product pitch to a giant unknown list is the marketing version of plugging a square peg into a round hole. It feels like activity, but it doesn't convert, and it burns your domain reputation on the way down. The buyers who are actually in-market are hiding in plain sight. The trick is knowing who they are and reaching them like a human.

At BenQ I built an engine to do exactly that. I paired ZoomInfo intent data (who's actively researching a product category right now) with HubSpot sequences, and sent the emails through each rep's own Outlook so they landed as a genuine one-to-one note, not a marketing blast. A rep could send well over a hundred personalized emails in a matter of minutes, and every reply came straight back to their inbox.

The insight I kept proving out is that specificity is the whole game. I built a five-level prospecting framework to make it teachable: broad category intent at the bottom, then industry, then company, then technology, then the personal level at the top, where you're writing to an HR director about the exact pain their job has this quarter. Effectiveness climbs at every step up. A broad blast might open at 15%. A tight, specific segment opened at 75% and actually replied.

I didn't keep this in marketing's hands. I wrote the sequences (antimicrobial screens for return-to-office, cloud whiteboarding for hybrid teams, NFC personalization pitched with an "iPhone moment" analogy), then trained the sales team and handed them ownership, because a rep who understands the buyer will always personalize better than a template can.

The honest lesson underneath it: automation isn't automated until the manual process actually works. Get the targeting and the writing right first, then scale it. Do it in the other order and you spend months troubleshooting a machine that was never going to work.

Proof: ZoomInfo intent workflows · HubSpot sequences · 5-level prospecting framework · email scripts and sales training.

Challenge

Known for education; needed to win enterprise/corporate AV buyers

Approach

Industry-first content and ABM: speak the industry's problem, product second

Built

Industry pillar pages, one-pagers, battle cards, a customer survey, a nurturing engine

Result

Webinar registrations +60% MoM · attendance +50% MoM · corporate channel reach +13% MoM

BenQ was a classroom brand trying to get taken seriously in the boardroom. We made great displays and projectors, but in enterprise AV we were the new name in the room, and nobody buys a meeting-room solution from a company they think of as "the school projector people." You don't fix that by shouting about your product louder. You fix it by proving you understand the buyer's world better than the incumbents do.

So I flipped the script: industry first, product second. Instead of leading with specs, we led with the problems specific industries were actually facing, and picked the ones still growing through the pandemic: healthcare, finance, transportation, and insurance. For each, I built industry pillar pages, one-pagers, and blog content that spoke to that vertical's pain before it ever mentioned a BenQ product. RFPs get started by non-technical stakeholders, and the more you help them frame the problem, the more you shape the solution they go looking for.

Then I gave us something the incumbents didn't have: our own data. I ran a survey of AV professionals and turned it into a "2021 Trends in A/V" infographic, which positioned BenQ as the company asking the questions instead of just selling the boxes, and gave resellers a branded stat sheet to hand their own customers.

Underneath all of it I built the plumbing, because content with no follow-through is just noise. I mapped nurturing flows to real personas (we actually named them, B2B Bill, Reseller Rick, SaaS Sam), aligned the handoff between marketing and sales in Salesforce and HubSpot, and set awareness-consideration-decision content to fire based on where a buyer actually was.

One thing I got wrong and fixed: a vague "industry" angle flopped in webinars until we paired each one with an actual industry expert to co-promote. Once we did, registrations grew 60% month over month and attendance 50%. Corporate channel reach climbed 13% MoM. The real win wasn't any single number. It was that BenQ started showing up in the enterprise conversation as a company with a point of view, not just a catalog.

Proof: Industry pillar pages · one-pagers and battle cards · "2021 Trends in A/V" survey infographic · nurturing and channel strategy.

Scope

Partner content library serving 1,200+ integrators and resellers

Problem

Top field complaint: partners couldn't find the right content

What I did

Research, then rebuilt the library by how partners actually search

Result

Field's #1 content complaint went away; messaging framework adopted cross-team

When partners complain that they don't have enough content, the instinct is to go make more content. Usually that's the wrong move. acre had a big partner library already, and the real complaint underneath the noise wasn't "we need more," it was "we can't find what's already here." Those are completely different problems, and only one of them is solved by writing another brochure.

I know that because I did the research first instead of guessing. A disorganized library doesn't announce itself as a problem. It just quietly costs you deals: a reseller who can't find the right asset in ninety seconds uses the wrong one, uses nothing, or goes and sells something easier. Nobody ever logs "bad taxonomy" as the reason a deal stalled.

So I audited the whole library and reorganized it around how partners actually sell, by the vertical they walk into, which meant healthcare, education, commercial office, and government, not by the internal product categories the company thought in. Then I designed a new taxonomy and tagging system so the top integrators' real needs mapped to findable, relevant assets inside the partner portal. The same research shaped messaging too, including a "Cloud Transformation Simplified" value proposition that got picked up across sales, partner, and marketing teams.

Reorganizing a library is less glamorous than launching a campaign. Nobody claps for a tagging system. But it takes friction out of every deal that comes after it, not just one, and the tell that it worked was simple: the complaint that started the whole project stopped being the complaint.

Proof: Partner portal taxonomy and reorganization · cross-team messaging framework. Available on request.

What

SEO / AEO / GEO content framework for the AI-search era

Reach

Presented portfolio-wide across the Volaris group

Context

B2B engineering / defense-adjacent, regulated (ITAR) environment

Applied to

Semiconductor-validation solution deck for engineering leaders

"AI" gets thrown around as a buzzword until it quietly breaks something you depend on. In this case it was search. Buyers started getting their answers straight from AI engines instead of clicking through to websites, and that breaks the assumption every content program is built on: that ranking well gets you found. If the answer engine gives the buyer what they need and never sends the click, being #1 in the old sense doesn't matter anymore. Most teams hadn't done the math on that yet. I built a framework to get ahead of it.

The framework covered three layers: SEO for classic search, AEO (Answer Engine Optimization) for showing up in direct answers, and GEO (Generative Engine Optimization) for earning a mention when an LLM writes the response. I kept it practical, not theoretical: how to structure content so an engine will cite you, how to earn presence in AI answers, and how to measure any of it when the old click metrics stop telling you the truth.

Then I did the harder part, which was getting other people to care before it hurt. I presented the framework portfolio-wide across the Volaris group as a best-practice model, which meant taking a genuinely new idea and translating it for peer teams with completely different products. I also put it to work on hard material, including a semiconductor-validation solution deck aimed at engineering leaders, an audience that wants technical credibility and business ROI in the same breath.

Being early only counts if you can bring people with you. The framework mattered less as a document and more as the thing that got teams to take AI's effect on search seriously before it cost them visibility. To me that's the part that actually counts. Not just having the insight, but making it useful to people who aren't as far down the rabbit hole as you are.

Proof: SEO/AEO/GEO framework (presented across the Volaris portfolio) · ScanWorks solution deck.

Situation

A strong niche test-and-validation company marketing quietly and reactively

What I did

Authored and drove the offensive 2025-2026 marketing plan

Levers

Competitive repositioning, persona-first website relaunch, analyst validation, testimonials, revenue attribution

Frame

Every initiative tied to a marketing-driven revenue model, not activity metrics

A company that only plays defense slowly disappears. ASSET made genuinely excellent board and chip test tools, but the marketing was quiet and reactive while competitors took the airtime and the search results. My job was to flip that, and I built the plan to do it.

Offense starts with naming your opponent. I sharpened our positioning to go directly at our named competitors on the ground we actually win, test coverage, cost savings, and a unified workflow, instead of the vague "we're great" messaging that convinces nobody. Then I used SEMrush to find the high-value keywords those competitors ranked for and built a structured plan to take that traffic, so we were competing for the buyer's attention at the exact moment they were shopping.

You can't run offense on a broken field, so I planned a persona-first website relaunch: simplify the message, cut the dead products still cluttering the site, and lead with the buyer instead of the catalog. Alongside it, I went after credibility we hadn't borrowed yet. A plan to commission independent analyst and industry validation, because a third party saying you're good carries weight that self-promotion never will, plus a testimonial and advocacy program that tapped champions at our largest accounts.

The part that's most me: I refused to bet the company on a vertical by gut. Before we poured budget into healthcare, I pulled a comparative analysis of market size, growth rate, and opportunity across healthcare and defense/aerospace, so we could validate or pivot the focus with data instead of a hunch. Same instinct on content, where I set up an A/B blog series, technical depth versus ROI messaging, to let engagement tell us which audience actually moved.

And I tied all of it to a marketing-driven revenue model: MQLs, influenced pipeline, ROI per channel, and revenue attribution by vertical. Marketing shouldn't hide behind activity metrics. It should be able to draw a line to pipeline, and this plan made that line the whole scoreboard.

Proof: 2025-2026 marketing plan · competitive positioning framework · website relaunch plan · marketing-driven revenue model. Available on request.